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Although most of the time people tell the truth, peopledo lie. On a bad day, those working in the justice sys-tem get lied to all day long. Some days the lies are
harmless, even unnecessary, and they amuse and entertain.
Some of the lies are a product of self-deception: “I can quit
doing drugs any time I want.” Some statements are not lies but
honest mistakes: “I’m sure that is the guy who robbed me.” But
on other days the lies are despicable and dangerous, and they
must be exposed. 
The question is: Can we tell the difference between the
truth and the lie? Many of us would like to believe we can rely
on our professional and personal instincts to guide us, or per-
haps even on some professional training we have received.
Often we rely on a process we cannot precisely describe, but
one in which we have confidence nonetheless. We just know.
Or do we?
There have been over 300 post-conviction DNA exonera-
tions in the United States. These cases are dramatic proof that
the ability of judges to determine the truth remains suspect.
Eighteen people had been sentenced to death before DNA
proved their innocence and led to their release. The average
sentence served by DNA exonerees before their release is about
13 years.1 Exonerations have been won in 35 states and Wash-
ington, D.C. And in every case in which DNA led to exonera-
tion, the courts were wrong in determining who was lying. The
cost of that mistake could have killed someone and is a stark
reminder of just how weak we are in determining who is lying.
Although it would be nice to have DNA to answer whether
someone stopped at a stop sign or did a California roll through
it, traffic cases will never be susceptible to DNA analysis. The
admonition “you always believe the police officer” may work
for a few judges or, more likely, may get a laugh among judges
at a cocktail party, but the fact remains that every day courts
make determinations about credibility and rarely is there seri-
ous discussion about how that happens or how to improve the
odds of getting it right. 
A MACHINE CAPABLE OF LIE DETECTION?
In the 1950s, one of the most popular new developments in
applying science to matters of justice was the polygraph,
known by many as the “lie detector.” The device was thought
to determine conclusively if a person was lying by measuring
several physiological indicators such as pulse, blood pressure,
galvanic skin response, and respiration. By having the subject
answer baseline questions and comparing measurements on
these indicators to measurements taken during responses to
questions related to a crime, investigators believed they were
able to accurately determine whether a person (e.g., a suspect
or prospective employee) was telling the truth or not.
Television talk-show host Dick Cavett once had F. Lee Bai-
ley on his show to demonstrate how the polygraph worked.2
Bailey was a strong proponent of the polygraph. Cavett asked
Bailey, “‘If lie detectors work, how come they’re not allowed in
court cases?’” Bailey responded, “‘They do work . . . . I use
them all the time.’” Cavett challenged Bailey to prove it. A few
weeks later, Bailey brought a state-of-the-art polygraph to the
show, complete with a qualified operator of the machine.
Cavett was questioned, and at the end of the questioning, the
polygraph examiner scanned the results. The examiner was to
his field what Henry Kissinger is to the field of foreign affairs:
an expert with a very pronounced German accent. According
to Cavett, the examiner began to noticeably sweat. The exam-
iner said to Bailey, “‘It didn’t vork.’” There, on national televi-
sion, the lie detector could not provide a definitive answer as
to whether a person had lied.3
In United States v. Scheffer, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that juries could be excessively swayed by the testimony
of polygraph experts. The opinion states: 
Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about fac-
tual matters outside the jurors’ knowledge, such as the
analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a
crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury
only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about
whether the witness was telling the truth. Jurisdictions,
in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be
concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive
weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they
are in scientific expertise and at times offering, as in
respondent’s case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue
in the trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately deter-
mine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph
evidence can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess
credibility and guilt.4
In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that
the evidence to support the reliability of the polygraph was
“unreliable, unscientific and biased.”5 But despite being dis-
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credited, the polygraph remains in widespread use by law
enforcement and prosecutors. Polarization of views on this
issue is reflected in the fact that 31 states bar the admission of
polygraph evidence per se.6 Eighteen states admit polygraph
results at trial if the parties stipulate
to its use before the administration of
the test.7 Only New Mexico allows
for the routine admission of poly-
graph evidence.8 The admissibility of
polygraph results in Federal Court
varies by circuit.9
Because just about every private
company uses a computer, the mail,
or a telephone system to send mes-
sages to someone in another state, the
federal Employee Polygraph Protec-
tion Act of 1988 has a broad applica-
tion.10 This Act prohibits nearly all
use of lie detectors in connection with
employment. It is illegal for all busi-
nesses covered by the Act to require or
even suggest that any employee or job
applicant submit to a lie-detector test.
If a business dismisses, disciplines,
discriminates against, or threatens to
take action against any employee or
job applicant who refuses to take a lie-
detector test, there are sanctions and
civil liability for the business. 
The latest version of the lie-detector machine is the fMRI, or
functional magnetic resonance imaging, developed in the
1990s. The fMRI is similar to the original polygraph machine:
the telling of a lie creates a measureable physiological
response, in this case increased blood oxygenation and blood
flow to the prefrontal and parietal regions of the brain. Images
can be created that show this brain activity. This work was
highlighted at a recent judicial seminar hosted by the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement
of Science and summarized in the
National Judicial College publication
Case in Point.11 Edward Lempinen
described the claims of the vendor
selling this “science” at the seminar
and recounted the critique of a uni-
versity neuroscientist who noted
among other concerns that the defin-
ition of when the brain is “activated”
is arbitrary. The vendor candidly
admitted that “‘[t]here will be mis-
takes. We will misclassify people.’”
But he went on to say that this was
not a big problem, since “‘[t]he judi-
cial system puts people away based
on ambiguous evidence all the time.’”
The next generation of lie-detector
machine is being developed by Cus-
toms and Border Protection, with
additional funding from the military.
This machine combines a micro-
phone to record the person’s voice, a
near-infrared camera to record pupil
dilation and glance location, and a high-definition video cam-
era to record body movements; in addition to recording
responses, the kiosk also functions as the interrogator asking
the questions. This machine is being field tested at the United
States-Mexico border, although budget reductions have slowed
6. See Van Meter v. State, 743 P.2d 385, 387-88 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 355, 358 (Colo. 1981);
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 758-59 (Conn. 1997); State v.
Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 109 (Haw. 1980); People v. Gard, 632
N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ill. 1994); Morton v. Commonwealth, 817
S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1991); Evans v. DeRidder Municipal Fire,
815 So. 2d 61, 67 (La. 2002); Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547
N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989); State v. Hawkins, 604 A.2d 489, 492
(Md. 1992); State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5, 8 (Me. 1989); People v.
Lagrou, No. 207,166, 1999 WL 33434265, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Oct. 22, 1999); Ledin v. State, No. C7-97-876, 1997 WL 757156,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1997); Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824,
836 (Miss. 1995); State v. Burch, 939 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); State v. Staat, 811 P.2d 1261, 1261 (Mont. 1991); State
v. Allen, 560 N.W.2d 829, 842 (Neb. 1997); State v. Ober, 493
A.2d 493, 493 (N.H. 1985); People v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700
(N.Y. 1969); State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351, 360-61 (N.C. 1983);
Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State
v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 231-33 (Or. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Brockington, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. 1983); State v. Werner, 851
A.2d 1093, 1104 (R.I. 2004); State v. Wright, 471 S.E.2d 700, 701-
02 (S.C. 1996); State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588 (S.D. 1985);
State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995); Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280, 293 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987); State v. Hamlin, 499 A.2d 45, 53-54 (Vt. 1985); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 36, 36-38 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); State
v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va. 1979); State v. Dean, 307
N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981).
7. See Cal. Evid. Code §351.1(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 11 of
2012 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/5/2012 ballot); Ex
parte Clements, 447 So.2d 695, 697-98 (Ala. 1984); State v. Mar-
quez, 558 P.2d 692, 696 (Ariz. 1976); Wingfield v. State, 796
S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ark. 1990); Melvin v. State, 606 A.2d 69, 71
(Del. 1992); Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 1975); Fore-
hand v. State, 477 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1996); State v. Fain, 774
P.2d 252, 256 (Idaho 1989); Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308
(Ind. 1996); State v. Losee, 354 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1984);
State v. Wakefield, 977 P.2d 941, 954 (Kan. 1999); State v.
Baskerville, 374 A.2d 441, 442 (N.J. 1977); Kazalyn v. State, 825
P.2d 578, 582 (Nev. 1992); Bismark v. Berger, 465 N.W.2d 480,
481 (N.D. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Brand, No. C-990548, 2000 WL
299497, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,
642 (Utah 1996); State v. Gregory, 910 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash.
1996); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 731 (Wyo. 1986).
8. State v. Sanders, 117 N.M. 452, 459, 872 P.2d 870 (1994).
9. See 140 A.L.R. Fed. 525 (originally published in 1997).
10. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001.
11. Edward W. Lempinen, Exploring the Impact of Neuroscience on Jus-
tice, CASE IN POINT, Spring 2008, at 22-23, available at
http://www.judges.org/pdf/caseinpoint_spring08.pdf.
There is no particular formula
for evaluating the truthfulness
and accuracy of another person’s
statements or testimony. You
bring to this process all of your 
varied experiences. In life, you
frequently decide the truthfulness 
and accuracy of statements
made to you by other people. 
The same factors used to make
those decisions, should be used 
when evaluating the testimony.
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its deployment.12 In an attempt to recognize and overcome the
fact that, once again, the machine is simply registering physio-
logical responses that are supposed to prove lying, the inventors
have received funding to study how people might defeat the
ability of the machine to read them. 
In the 1700s, a German doctor believed that the shape and
contours of the human skull could predict a person’s character
and therefore criminality. For many years, some believed this
new “science” of phrenology would revolutionize criminal law,
but today the idea is totally discredited. Similarly, the best sci-
entific evidence today is clear: the polygraph should be tossed
to the junkyard of pseudoscience like phrenology. No one can
predict whether some new machine may be invented. But
today all of the machines are based on a faulty premise that, in
each and every case, telling a lie will provoke a physiological
response in all people. That link is simply not true. Some peo-
ple can lie without any physiological response; indeed Soviet
spies were trained to lie without any physiological response,
and it worked. The problem is not the polygraph machine or
the fMRI or the interrogator kiosk, it is the premise upon
which they are based. While it is understandable that judges
and others want some forensic machine to help, there is sim-
ply no machine that can determine if a witness is lying, or con-
versely, if a person is telling the truth. All these technologies
generate unacceptably high rates of false positives—that is,
results that suggest truthful people are lying when they are not.
CAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TEACH JUDGES TO DETECT
LIES?
The drive to develop a science of lie detection extends to the
social sciences as well. The earliest versions of the behavioral-
science approach argued that certain eye behaviors, such as
gaze aversion and shifting eyes left or right, could successfully
determine deception. A review of evaluations of this claim
found that “[23] out of 24 peer-reviewed studies published in
scientific journals reporting experiments on eye behavior as an
indicator of lying have rejected this hypothesis. No scientific
evidence exists to suggest that eye behavior or gaze aversion
can gauge truthfulness reliably.”13 And yet there remain the
popular myths that timing and duration of speech are off when
someone is lying. Some claim people touch their nose more
when lying and a great deal less when telling the truth. Others
claim a liar breathes faster, displaying short breaths followed
by one deep breath. And there is the popular myth that the
mouth may appear dry (causing much throat clearing). The
problem with these myths is they just are not true. So placing
a water pitcher in front of a wit-
ness and waiting for signs of dry
mouth will not advance the quest
to find the truth. But it is a nice
thing to do for the witness.
A more recent version of the
behavioral-science approach is
based on the recognition of
microexpressions—brief involun-
tary facial expressions generated
by emotions. This training is pack-
aged and sold online as “products”
with names like “Micro Expression Training Tool” and “Subtle
Expression Training Tool,” with the tag line “Accept No Sub-
stitutes.”14 One website boasts that their “deception expert . . .
teaches scientifically proven methods of lie detecting . . . .
These ‘state of the art’ methods are what federal agents, law
enforcement and other professionals are taught when they seek
the highest accuracy rates.”15
Although not a single study supports the idea that those
taking “training” to detect behavioral cues said to accompany
a lie are better at determining whether a person is lying,
courses continue to be taught to law enforcement, prosecutors,
and judges, enticing them to “[s]ee why Government agencies,
Fortune 500 companies, educational and medical professionals
are using Dr. Ekman’s training to enhance their ability to bet-
ter ‘read’ people and detect truth and lies.”16 Here, the claim to
scientific truth is enhanced by the claim that not only is this
training “scientifically proven and field tested,” it is “now the
basis of a new television show on FOX/SKY tv—Lie to Me—to
which Dr. Paul Ekman is the Scientific Consultant.”17
The same psychologists who publish academic papers in
professional journals admitting that “[i]n every study reported,
people have not been very accurate in judging when someone
is lying”18 and “[i]t is unlikely that judging deception from
demeanor will ever be sufficiently accurate to be admissible in
the courtroom”19 also serve as faculty to state and local judges
for the courses designed to convince them of the opposite—
namely, that they can be taught to accurately detect lies.20 There
is nothing wrong with exploring what we know and don’t know
about something as central to justice as the ability to determine
what is a lie, but the danger such courses potentially create is
that they convince the students they have achieved expertise.
This “expert effect” results in its opposite: “‘you become less,
not more, effective than the average person, likely because of
overconfidence or overblown belief in yourself.’”21
[T]here is simply
no machine that
can determine 
if a witness is
lying, or 
conversely, if 
a person is
telling the truth.
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Studies have shown those who
have taken such courses are more
likely to believe they know when
someone is lying than others and to
cease to adhere to the duty to
examine all the evidence at hand. A
judge who believes he or she is a
lie-detection expert is making deci-
sions based on false criteria invisi-
ble to other actors. Such a judge
does not make explicit that he or
she has made a ruling based on
interpreting the sideward glance or posture of a defendant in
response to a question. Too often the jargon of a written order
is “based on the demeanor of the witness.” By relying on this
“training” the judge succumbs to the danger foreseen by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Scheffer, namely abandoning
the duty to evaluate all the facts, testimony, and evidence before
him or her. Armed with this training, judges, like law enforce-
ment, can succumb to confirmation bias, in which they see and
hear what they want to hear based on the rules of behavior
defined in the training while ignoring facts and behaviors that
exist outside of that framework. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FALSE CONFESSIONS
Perhaps no lie seems as counterintuitive as the false confes-
sion. In about 25% of DNA-exoneration cases, innocent defen-
dants made incriminating statements, made complete confes-
sions, or even pled guilty. If you can’t rely on a confession
being the truth, what can you believe? Most confessions are
genuine, and people plead guilty because they are guilty. But
these cases show that confessions can occasionally be a lie. 
How is it that someone confesses to something he or she did
not do? A study by Saul Kassin and Jennifer Perillo of John Jay
College of Criminal Justice tested how bluffing affects “confes-
sions” gained from innocent parties.22 The subjects of the
study were instructed to complete a task on a computer and
then were falsely accused of crashing the computer or collabo-
rating with a colleague to improve their performance. Bluff evi-
dence, false evidence, and unreliable witnesses were used to
test their effect. In the first test, 60% of the subjects “con-
fessed” to pressing a computer key they had been instructed to
avoid when, in fact, they had not. Research has identified two
sets of risk factors for false confessions: (1) dispositional vul-
nerabilities inherent in the suspect, such as youth, intellectual
impairments, mental illness, and personality traits that foster
compliance and suggestibility; and (2) situational pressures
inherent in the conditions of custody and interrogation, such
as excessive time, the presentation of false incriminating evi-
dence, and the use of minimization themes that imply leniency.
Studies by Dr. Robert Horselenberg of Maastricht University
have similar results to the Kassin and Perillo research. Dr.
Horselenberg and his fellow researchers told 83 people that
they were taking part in a taste test for a supermarket chain.
The top taster would win a prize such as an iPad or a set of
DVDs. The volunteers were asked to try ten cans of fizzy drink
and guess which was which. The labels were obscured by socks
pulled up to the rim of each can, so to cheat a volunteer had
only to lower the sock. The test was filmed by a hidden camera,
which caught ten participants who actually did cheat. Bafflingly,
though, another eight falsely confessed when accused by the
experimenter.23
In Colorado v. Connelly, Justice Brennan’s dissent detailed
the powerful impact a confession has on the outcome of a case.
Justice Brennan wrote: 
Our distrust for reliance on confessions is due, in part,
to their decisive impact upon the adversarial process. Tri-
ers of fact accord confessions such heavy weight in their
determinations that “the introduction of a confession
makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous,
and the real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs when
the confession is obtained.” No other class of evidence is
so profoundly prejudicial. “Thus the decision to confess
before trial amounts in effect to a waiver of the right to
require the state to meet its heavy burden of proof.” 24
False confessions demonstrate the limitations on our ability
to determine what is a lie even where it is so obvious that the
“lie” is against one’s self-interest. There are reforms that have
or can significantly reduce the likelihood that the “confession”
is in fact a lie. Some states in recent years have tried, either
through legislation or court decisions, to ensure the confession
is not a lie.25 Videotaping confessions and changing interroga-
tion methods are the most common reforms and have the
potential to aid in differentiating lies from the truth. University
of Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett, author of the 2011
book Convicting the Innocent, reviewed 250 cases of people
who were exonerated by DNA evidence. Garrett found that
suspects confessed in detail to crimes they didn’t commit in 40
of those cases. None of the interrogations in those cases was
recorded in its entirety. As Garrett noted, when the entire inter-
rogation is recorded, discovering whether interrogators have
provided suspects with key details of the crime is a lot easier.26
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Eyewitness identification that is inaccurate is most likely
not a lie but the product of self-deception or just an honest
mistake. This is what we know about the phenomenon of eye-
A judge who
believes he 
or she is a lie-
detection expert
is making 
decisions based
on false 
criteria . . . . 
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witness identification: mistakes can happen. As with false con-
fessions, we know that reforms in police procedures can
reduce the possibility of a mistake. We know at a minimum
that jury instructions regarding eyewitness testimony can be
improved. 
Law enforcement, lawyers, judges, and psychologists have
worked together to make eyewitness testimony more reliable
and accurate. Although the United States Supreme Court
declined to order new procedures in Perry v. New Hampshire,27
and held that the Due Process Clause does not require a pre-
liminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness
identification when the identification was not procured under
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances, New Jersey and Ore-
gon have introduced significant reforms on their own.28 In the
words of the New Jersey Supreme Court, there is a “troubling
lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications.”29 Could the
same be said of some of our judgments regarding when a
defendant or a witness is lying? And if that is so, should courts
at a minimum rethink what jury instructions should say?
Telling people to use the same factors you use in life sounds
pretty simple; it is just that many of the factors we use are
wrong—or at least challengeable.
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM MINDFULNESS
There is a compelling body of social and cognitive research
on how people make decisions and how the brain processes
information. The caveat here is that there is still much that sci-
entists do not know, but what is known and widely accepted
may improve a judge’s ability to figure out whom to believe.
Anchoring is the well-documented phenomenon that
describes the process through which an individual’s estimates
or comparison judgments are influenced by an initial value;
information provided early in a process shapes subsequent
judgments.30 This can occur with judges just like anyone else.
The problem if a judge anchors on a fact, or even worse, an
irrelevant fact, is that anchoring can blind the judge to other
evidence or an alternative view of what happened. Judgment
about lying can be premature and then distorted by confirma-
tion bias where the decision maker overly focuses on facts sup-
porting the premature decision and ignores facts that are
inconsistent with that view. One study found that criminal-law
judges exposed to a high anchor responded to incriminating
evidence faster than exculpatory evidence (measured by
response latencies on a timed categorization test), suggesting
that the anchor primed the judges to look for anchor-consis-
tent information. The same was not true for exculpatory infor-
mation. The researchers found this consistent with prior
research indicating that nega-
tive information tends to be
more salient for individuals in
general, and they hypothesized
that judges focus on the incrim-
inating information because
they are charged with determin-
ing whether the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.31 In addition, the crimi-
nal-law judges were more cer-
tain about their decisions than those who were not experts in
criminal law, suggesting that “experts may mistakenly see
themselves as less susceptible to biasing influences on their
sentencing decisions.”32
It is plausible that the expertise criminal-law judges had
was a product of egocentricity—overconfidence in one’s abili-
ties. Egocentricity may be the single most important lesson
from mindfulness research. Simply put, overconfidence in
one’s ability may be counterproductive to good decision mak-
ing. While the culture of judicial decision making is weighted
toward rarely expressing self-doubt, good judicial decision
making—in this case, trying to determine the truth—needs to
be heavily weighted toward acknowledging that this is a diffi-
cult task.
Implicit biases can also affect one’s judgment. Implicit
biases are based on attitudes or stereotypes that operate below
the radar.33 As a result, individuals are not aware that implicit
biases may be affecting their behaviors and decisions. Indeed,
research shows that even individuals who consciously strive to
be fair and objective can nonetheless be influenced by implicit
biases.34 The good news is that the researchers found that
“when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own
responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are
motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”35
WHAT IS A JUDGE TO DO?
Forensic science has produced valuable new advances that
have contributed to making the system of justice better. Those
advances, however, also have revealed that sometimes faulty
forensic-science analyses may have contributed to egregious
errors. There are expensive polygraph machines and lie-detec-
tor apps for an iPhone—even iBodyLanguage. These apps are
cheap and entertaining. However, there is no machine that can
accurately detect if the defendant is telling the truth when he
or she either confesses to a horrific crime or claims to have
stopped at a stop sign. But the quest for the truth cannot be
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deterred by a lack of a machine (or an app for your iPhone).
The notion that whether a person is lying or telling the truth
can be detected by a trained expert remains a popular one, but
it is simply not supported by behavioral science. That science
teaches us that behaviors claimed to prove lying are often
merely expressions of stress or anxiety. An honest person, asked
a question in a stressful setting, may fidget, avoid eye contact,
cross his or her arms, or contradict himself or herself, none of
which constitute definitive proof of lying. Conversely, a variety
of instances have been documented in which spies trained
themselves to provide false statements during a polygraph, and
as a result they “beat” the machine and the lie is seen as truth.
Habitual liars may register no behaviors that suggest deception,
since dishonesty is a way of life for them.
Talking about lying might be nothing but fodder for inter-
esting conversation were it not for the profound consequences
of getting this wrong. As clarified in Daniel Kahneman’s award-
winning book Thinking, Fast and Slow, focus requires energy to
sustain slower, deliberative, and rational decision making.36
Judges cannot simply throw up their hands and say, “deter-
mining who is lying cannot be done.” But they can—indeed
must—improve the process of making the decision about what
is a lie. 
Three things can make a judge a better judicial lie detector. 
1. Judges should acknowledge that the human mind can play
tricks on them in determining who is lying. Egocentrism
may be a term of art in psychology that is more easily
understood in the context of courts as “black robe disease.”
If a judge assumes that he or she has unique powers to
determine who is telling the truth either because of “train-
ing” or some inherited talent, there is an increased likeli-
hood of making a mistake.
2. Judges need to use their brains in following the testimony
and evaluating inconsistencies, rather than relying on visual
cues, to try to figure out what is “more probably true than
not true” at trial. Even in this endeavor, though, judicial
humility is really what is called for. Everyone who tells a
story several times may have some inconsistencies in the
retelling of the story, and yet these are not lies. Rather than
jumping on one inconsistency in a witness’s testimony,
judges should think. In the final analysis, that inconsistency
may prove so compelling that a judge should simply not
believe the testimony. But, just as juries are instructed to do,
judges need to do their best to keep an open mind until
they’ve heard—and carefully considered—everything
before them. Judges need to ask: Am I anchoring? Did I
make a premature judgment and ignore conflicting evi-
dence? Was my decision the product of confirmation bias?
Is there a chance my decision about who to believe is a
product of implicit bias?
3. In the final analysis, the burden of proof may well be the
most important safeguard for judges. The standard in crim-
inal cases is a high one (“beyond a reasonable doubt”), but
the standard in civil cases (“more likely”) is no less com-
pelling in its demand. While many cases are clear cut, there
are many others where the facts are often murky.37 As trite
as it may seem, relying on the burden of proof is the most
overarching and important step toward improving the abil-
ity to recognize or admit you cannot detect a lie. And that is
the honest truth. 
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